quicksilver wrote:Yeah…your car needs a 30K mile inspection so you decide to buy a new one instead.
The SLM process is a year long with finite capacity. So if you can only turnaround 10-24 jets a year, meaning you can only spit out one to two post SLM'd Block III squadrons a year, the additional new jets will allow them to convert another squadron faster and retire the older Block I birds that can't be converted (and give the oldest Block II's to fleet replacement squadrons and adversary squadrons, or turn them to parts birds rather than SLM them).
The Navy isn't standing up new squadrons with new jets. Heck it hasn't stood up - or even resurrected - an operational VFA squadron in decades. So where do you think they're all going?
Also, just so we are clear, you do realize this is exactly what is going to have to happen to all the Block 1-3 F-35's that need to go back to the factory for their Block IV upgrades, right? I'm sure you wouldn't disagree with getting more brand new Block IV F-35's during that time to help hasten the conversions.
And what do you think limits F-35C production, Admiral? (And don’t tell us production capacity cuz the answer is the same)
Production capacity is absolutely going to be a problem. All the FMS wins with 2025 target introduction dates for hungry customers is going to mean there's no wiggle room to just magically plus up orders. Look at the timetables the Brits are staring at for their next lot of F-35Bs - and they're a Tier 1 partner.
The parts logistics problem is another problem - the F-35As have a backlog of jets needing powerplant parts, and they are older as a whole than the F-35C fleet, meaning the F-35C fleet is potentially going to run into the same issue in a few years when they hit the same time point, unless they fix the logistics issues. Adding jets that can't be flown increases the strain on maintenance, since periodic jet inspections (those due by calendar days regardless of how much flying has been done) still have to be done, or else you risk further grounding the jet. So a jet not flying isn't just a paper weight: you now have something actively straining your capacity.
Moreover, you're not considering the rest of the enterprise. How about the inability to convert squadrons faster? Ever consider that with the shutdown of VFA-101 and the cancellation of plans to have an east coast F-35C basing option, and the need to build brand new hangars for F-35Cs at NAS Lemoore, and the year plus time to convert squadrons (it's taken over a year for VFA-147, VMFA-314, and VFA-97 to each reach safe for flight) - as well as the pilot shortage/retention problems in USN (and DoD as a whole, for that matter) - that we might already be at capacity for inducing more planes?
More money isn't magically going to produce qualified instructor pilots when we also have to fill air wings today, nor suddenly make converting pilots to 5th gen qualified mission commanders any quicker either (the F-35A-C initial operational syllabus is THE longest in any branch, as you'd expect with all its capabilities).
And none of this even touches upon how the Navy wants to shape its forces for the envisioned fight that might occur tomorrow, 3 years from now, 5 years for now, or a decade from now. It's not like C2D2 and Block IV software integration hasn't had its fair share of challenges, so some platform capabilities you would need in the F-35C to cover what the USN is currently using the F/A-18E/F for aren't going to magically come tomorrow. I'd love to see 40 F-35Cs onboard tomorrow, but until the F-35Cs are carrying things like LRASM (or even Harpoon II+'s), the Navy is going to need a mix of planes that complement each other.
Corsair1963 wrote:
The USN would easily take more F-35C's.
How so?
Like I said above - that's not really the case. The very fact the USMC is also utilizing the Navy to convert its squadrons to the F-35C and we're currently only able to do one squadron conversion a year - to say nothing about all the infrastructure that has to get put in ashore and afloat - makes this a far bigger challenge than just giving some existing squadrons new jets.
They only JUST finished building Hangar 6 at NAS Lemoore, just to house VFA-147 and VFA-97, and that took over a couple of years of building (147 had to operate out of the same spaces as -125, the FRS, for a while).
Yet, they want the US Congress to increase their budget to pay for them....
I mean, that's the point, right? If they can only support inducing say, 20 new jets this year (like say 10 to a converting squadron, 4 to the FRS, 2 to OT, 3 to NAWDC, 1 to DT), they're going to make sure they ask for what they can do with what they've already budgeted for, and let Congress be responsible for adding the money for additional planes + logistics + infrastructure + maintenance personnel that would be required to have a commensurate growth in all the areas required to sustain the additional acquisitions, some of which have to be budgeted years in advance. If Congress adds it, it's a lot easier to get them on the hook to keep paying for all the other things required to keep sustaining the force.
Also, like I wrote above, money can't magically develop every capability wanted quicker. With the way the program is structured - the highly integrated software and commonality between the customers - comes the fact that the Navy is just one of many customers with a wishlist of capabilities they want developed. And you can only do so many parallel streams of development before you have to make sure all the code gets put in together and plays nicely with one another, or else you end up breaking things unintentionally (we call this regression testing, which is where we go back and test previous capabilities to make sure upgrades didn't break something in the code or hardware accidentally).
So it's a LOT easier for the Navy to develop systems and weapons on a separate platform they completely own (e.g., LRASM and AARGM-ER) and get a lot of the tougher initial developmental work done there, than simultaneously develop a new weapon and also try to integrate it into the F-35C, when they can do that later as they start coming in larger numbers after the kinks have been worked out. It also helps the JPO and the rest of the F-35 fleet by helping prioritize those weapons and capabilities they want now that won't exist anywhere other than on an F-35, vice adding systems that are already fielded elsewhere. It's the same reason the Air Force isn't in a rush to integrate JASSM into the F-35 (a bunch of other platforms already carry them), but really wants to get its Block IV EW capabilities out ASAP.
